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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE RODNEY KING CASE
AKHIL REED AMARt
Yesterday I tried to suggest, that in doing Constitutional
Law, we must think about the founding vision and also about
how that founding vision may have been modified by a
reconstruction vision. Yesterday's application of this approach
involved freedom of expression and religious liberty. Today I
would like to focus on a different application-double
jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides that "[n]o person shall ... be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
In order to think about some of the issues that this clause
raises, I am going to meditate on a famous case-the so-called
Rodney King case. We all remember that Los Angeles police
officers beat Rodney King. Video tapes captured the beating
and were broadcast over, and over, and over again. State
authorities prosecuted local police officials. The state trial
basically resulted in the acquittal of the officers. Mter consid-
erable consternation-the recent unpleasantness in Los
Angeles-a federal prosecution ensued under federal civil
rights laws. In the federal prosecution of these officers, a
couple were convicted.
The first question that arises is, "Gee, how is that possible?
Weren't those officers in effect twice subjected to jeopardy by
these two trials?" And the short answer to that, in our legal
culture, is the dual sovereignty doctrine. This doctrine states
that a prosecution by the federal government does not count
as the same offense as a prosecution by the state government.
The prosecutions are entirely different because they involve
• The Cumberland Law Review wishes to thank Steve Edmondson of Edmondson
Reporting and Video, Binningham, Alabama for his transcription services.
•• Revised and edited.
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different governments. We will talk today about whether that
doctrine makes sense.
Even if the officers cleared the first hurdle, there would be
a second question: Assuming we count the federal prosecution
as possibly being the same as the state prosecution, were the
two statutes at issue really the same-did they describe the
same offense or different offenses? The state statute was
basically an assault and battery statute. The federal statute was
a federal civil rights law. Were those the same offense or
different offenses?
And finally, I want to address one more set of issues in the
Rodney King case that may have troubled some people: the
composition of the initial Simi Valleyjury-the state courtjury
in the first Rodney King trial. In that first trial, as many of you
will recall, no blacks were chosen to sit on the jury. And, of
course, it was a racially charged case. Suppose, just for the
sake of argument, that the no-black jury resulted from
unconstitutional racial manipulation by the defense attorneys.
Let us say they used peremptory challenges in an unconstitu-
tional way, or got a venue transfer solely to manipulate the
composition of that jury. Would that be at all relevant, in
trying to decide whether that jury's acquittal should be
absolutely final for double jeopardy purposes? How should we
think about race discrimination in juries in the context of the
double jeopardy idea? Suppose, for example, that California
(the same government) proposed to reprosecute the officers,
for the very same offense, under a theory that the first jury was
somehow rigged. The defendants, by hypothesis, were respon-
sible for that manipulation. So California argues, let us
suppose, that the acquittal should not count. What should we
think about that theory?
Those are three different sets of issues we will talk about
today. In addressing these questions, we have to think holisti-
cally about a single Constitution. We teach the double
jeopardy clause in one part of our curriculum-eriminal
procedure. Does teaching the clause only in that part of the
curriculum obscure its meaning? Does it cause us to miss
certain connections between the Rodney King case and other
parts of the Constitution that we often teach in other courses?
We should think, for example, about how our double jeopardy
jurisprudence connects up to larger issues of federalism-the
relationship between the state and the federal government,
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and between the states. In addition, we should think about
double jeopardy in comparison to other big constitutional
issues such as separation of powers. Thus, the impeachment
clause of the Constitution, which is one of our separation of
powers provisions, casts interesting light on double jeopardy.
We should also see double jeopardy in light of the importance
of jury trials. We talked a lot yesterday about jury trials, and
today we will ponder the connection between double jeopardy
and jury trials, and in tum the connection between jury trials
and more basic issues of representation. Who is on the jury?
Does the jury really represent the people? Does it look like
America? Is it the kind of body that is worthy of respect, and
does that in any way depend on who gets to be on it and how
they are selected? So we must think about the connection
between double jeopardy and jury trials, and between jury
trials and democratic representation theory more generally.
These are issues that resemble voting rights issues-who is in
the legislature and what does our legislature look like?
Consider also the jurisprudence of plain meaning. In
constitutional law in· the last twenty years, attention has been
focused on the possibility that the Constitution could be
interpreted in a straightforward way: just read the words. This
big idea in constitutional theory was championed by the great
Hugo Black, about whom I spoke briefly yesterday, and is
today championed by Justice Scalia. Oddly enough, this big
idea has not quite seeped into conversations about criminal
procedure, largely because we have segregated criminal
procedure. We teach it in a separate course. So in thinking
about what is the same offense, we should consider a plain
meaning approach-same means same-and then ask what
that plain meaning approach would look like.
Finally and most fundamentally, we must think about this
clause in the context of the reconstruction-about how this
clause is an example of the need to focus not just on the
founding vision of our Constitution but on the reconstruction
vision too.
This is just a general map of some of the issues I will
discuss. My talk today is based on an article that appeared in
the January issue of the Columbia Law Review. I co-authored
that article with a former student, Jon Marcus. Our article is
called DoubleJeopardy Law After Rodney King. l
1 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1995).
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I. THE DUAL SOVEREIGNlY DOCTRINE
First, let us consider the dual sovereignty doctrine. Maybe
the best way to describe the dual sovereignty doctrine is to tell
you about a case from right here in Alabama, Heath v.
Alabama.2 This case, which was decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1985, is the Supreme Court's most recent
exposition of the so-called dual sovereignty doctrine. The facts,
I must warn you, are quite grisly.
Mr. Heath apparently hired a couple of people to murder
his wife. They kidnapped her in Alabama and then apparently
dragged her across the state line to Georgia where the murder
took place. Heath was prosecuted in Georgia for murder. Mter
pleading guilty, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. But
then Alabama decided that the sentence was not quite
enough, so Alabama prosecuted Heath for the same murder.
The question was whether Alabama could prosecute Heath
when he had obviously already been subjected to jeopar-
dy-there had already been one conviction.
Double jeopardy is about three basic ideas: (1) autrefois
convict-once convicted, one cannot be reprosecuted for the
same crime; (2) autrefois acquit-once acquitted, one cannot
be reprosecuted for the same crime; and (3) pardon-once
pardoned, one cannot be prosecuted for the same crime.
Heath was basically saying, "autrefois convict. I have
already been convicted of this same murder. A murder is the
same in Alabama as it is in Georgia. There is no difference."
And Alabama said, "No, that was a Georgia case. And a
Georgia case under Georgia law is just different from an
Alabama case under Alabama law. So by definition this really
is not the same offense. This is a different offense because it
is an Alabama prosecution rather than a Georgia prosecution."
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with
Alabama. And so Heath was subject to and did indeed receive
the death sentence. I do not know if it was actually carried
out, but the Supreme Court said that the second proceeding
was perfectly acceptable because the dual sovereignty doctrine
applies the double jeopardy clause within a state or within a
jurisdiction but not across jurisdictions.
Now here is one aspect of double jeopardy that is some-
what odd. From Larry Gene Heath's perspective it looks like
we have prosecuted him twice for the same murder. Suppose
! 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
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he had been acquitted in the Georgia proceeding-proved
innocent. Using the Supreme Court's logic, that would not
matter either because by definition the Alabama case would be
different from the Georgia case.· He would have to run the
gauntlet a second time. In essence, he would be on trial twice
for one murder. Here the double jeopardy language of "life or
limb" is not metaphoric. He is really on trial for his life even
after he had been acquitted in a full and fair trial, because of
the logic of the dual sovereignty doctrine: Georgia prosecu-
tions do not count for Alabama purposes.
Now, here is another oddity from Heath's perspective: The
Fourteenth Amendment made many rights applicable against
the states-jury rights, freedoms of speech and. press, and
many other privileges and immunities. In particular, double
jeopardy was made applicable against the states. So the double
jeopardy clause applies against Alabama, through the Four-
teenth Amendment. It also applies against Georgia through
the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal Constitution protects
against two prosecutions by Georgia, and against two prosecu-
tions by Alabama. But somehow it does not protect against two
prosecutions when the two governments are acting in tandem.
Here is another odd aspect of the dual sovereignty
doctrine. The double jeopardy clause comes from English
common law. In England, at the time of the founding and
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the English
principle was that if you had been tried by a foreign govern-
ment-South Mrica, Portugal, Thailand-that prosecution,
conviction or acquittal, could bar reprosecution in an English
court. This is still the English rule today. So in England, the
law would enable you to plead double jeopardy if you had
been tried in a foreign court. What is strange, then, is that
England in 1985 would not have reprosecuted Heath. They
would have said, a Georgia prosecution counts for an English
one. England would have given more respect to that Georgia
adjudication than the sister state of Alabama did. Of course,
there is an especially close relationship between Alabama and
Georgia-they are sister states in the federal union. For God's
sake, England would even give respect to a French judgment!
And yet Alabama refuses to give respect to a sister state's
judgment, and refuses on the basis of the very same English
common law idea that is word for word in our federal Consti-
tution. This very same English law, via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, now applies against the states.
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Well, where did we get this dual sovereignty doctrine?
Heath was an unusual case. It was a state-state case. The heart
of the dual sovereignty doctrine, however, is tied to the early
period of our nation's history when thought revolved around
federal-state relations more than state-state federalism.
Let us go back to the era of Barron v. Baltimore.!l Remem-
ber that Barron was a famous case in the 1830's where Chief
Justice Marshall said that the Bill of Rights did not apply
against the states. Keep in mind, though, that Barron was not
addressing the very complicated situations that arise when
both state .and federal governments act together as in cases
with a state prosecution and a federal prosecution or when
federal mails are delivered but the postmasters comply with
state law. Barron was not addressing some of those tricky state-
federal interactions. But the cases after Barron read it to mean
the following: In essence, double jeopardy applies against the
federal government. The federal government cannot prosecute
anyone twice. But the state can prosecute an individual as
many times as it wants. As a matter of federal constitutional
law, the double jeopardy clause does not apply. And indeed,
what the two governments can do separately they can do in
tandem too. So as long as the Feds do not prosecute twice,
double jeopardy rights have been honored. If the states
prosecute you once, and then the Feds prosecute you, that is
acceptable. If the Feds prosecute you once and then the states
prosecute you, that is okay too. Because of Barron, you are
privileged only from two prosecutions by the federal govern-
ment.
In 1969, the Supreme Court, in a case called Benton v.
Maryland,4 said, ''You know, double jeopardy does apply against
the states, just as freedom of speech applies against the states.
The freedom of the press, the free exercise of religion, the
establishment clause, jury trial and so on-they all apply
against the states."
So now, doublejeopardy does apply against the states. And
it seems a bit bizarre that although we have repudiated the
Barron idea, we still retain the dual sovereignty doctrine. The
dual sovereignty doctrine at one level seems a legacy of Barron.
We have rid ourselves of Barron, so why do we still keep the
dual sovereignty doctrine? If you are privileged from dual
532 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
4395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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prosecution by the Feds and you are privileged from dual
prosecution by, say, Alabama, then why shouldn't you also be
privileged from dual prosecution by the two of them together?
Especially when the Feds and the Alabama police departments
often work together.
Now take that one step further. Just substitute California
for Alabama, and you have the argument of the defendants in
the Rodney King case: "We are protected from two prosecu-
tions by California. We are protected from two prosecutions by
the Feds. Why shouldn't we be protected from two prosecu-
tions by the two governments acting in tandem?"
There are a couple more arguments they could make-
arguments from precedent. These arguments have to do with
search and seizure law and also with incrimination law. First,
consider search and seizure law. For a long time, the rule has
been that the Feds cannot seize evidence unconstitutionally
and then use it against an individual in a prosecution. This is
the so-called exclusionary rule. (For the record, I am opposed
to the exclusionary rule, but that is the rule.) But the Fourth
Amendment under Barron did not originally apply to the
states. So for many years there was no federal exclusionary rule
that applied to state police officers.
So then what happened? State police officers would search
and seize, sometimes unreasonably. Then, they might hand
the evidence over to the federal officials, saying, here you can
use it. Or vice-versa, federal officials might search and seize
unreasonably and hand the evidence over to state prosecutors.
This was the so called silver platter doctrine: one government
would unreasonably search, get evidence, and hand it over on
a silver platter to the other. For a while such practices were
allowed. But, eventually the Supreme Court decided a case
called Wolf v. Coloradtf' and held (in effect) that the Fourth
Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and
seizures was also applicable against state governments.
The Court did not apply the exclusionary rule yet, but it
said states could not unreasonably search and seize. Mter that
case was decided, states continued to engage in unreasonable
searches and seizures, and would at times give the evidence
over to the Feds. So then the Supreme Court said that these
actions were no longer acceptable. Once it was decided that
Fourth Amendment principles were applicable against the
5 338 u.s. 25 (1949).
HeinOnline -- 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 8 1995-1996
8 CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:1
states, this sort of debasement of the exclusionary law was no
longer acceptable on the dual sovereignty premise that these
were separate governments. At the time that incorporation was
occurring in the Fourth Amendment, we got rid of dual
sovereignty-but only in the exclusionary rule context.
Now we come to self-incrimination. For a long time the
rule was that the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause
did not apply against the states. So here is what happened:
The Feds would force an individual to testify, say before
Congress. In return, they would grant that person immunity
from federal prosecution. But here is the kicker: The state
could then take that testimony and use it to prosecute that
person. Or the states could force someone to testify before the
state legislature, granting immunity, with the promise that that
person would not be prosecuted. But, then, the Feds would
take that testimony and use it to prosecute. In theory, both
governments were acting within their rights; neither the
federal nor the state government, in each respective case,
technically broke its promise. And the Supreme Court upheld
all of this. Because of Barron and dual sovereignty, the
Constitution was only applicable when the federal government
both forced someone to testify, and then used the evidence to
prosecute. But the very day the Court incorporated the
self-incrimination clause against the states in a 1965 case called
Malloy v. Hogan,6 the Justices, in a companion case, said that
since they had incorporated the clause against the states, they
were not going to let the governments play this dual sovereign-
ty game.
So here is the odd thing: at the very time we incorporated,
in effect, the Fourth Amendment against the states, we got rid
of dual sovereignty in the Fourth Amendment context. The
very day we incorporated self-incrimination against the states,
we got rid of dual sovereignty in that context. But we never
got rid of dual sovereignty in the double jeopardy context,
when we incorporated double jeopardy against the states.7
That seems a little odd.
Now, what is the argument on the other side? It also
focuses on incorporation. Incorporation is a key ingredient in
6378 U.S. 1 (1964).
7 The Supreme Court Justices have never explained why they got rid of dual
sovereignty in the Fourth Amendment and self-incrimination contexts, while keeping it
for double jeopardy.
HeinOnline -- 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 9 1995-1996
1995] DISTINGUISHED LECTURER SERIES-AMAR 9
this whole equation. It is not just the original founding vision
that matters but the Fourteenth Amendment, too.
Here is a Fourteenth Amendment argument on the other
side that is dramatized by the Rodney King case. In the
context of the Fourth Amendment, if states unreasonably
search and seize, the Feds can still prosecute as long as they
do it independently. In the self-incrimination context, if the
states force someone to give immunized testimony, the Feds,
in theory, can still prosecute as long as it is done independent-
ly. However, in the double jeopardy context, if we got rid of
the dual sovereignty doctrine, and the states prosecuted and
acquitted someone, that would altogether bar federal prosecu-
tion: autrefois acquit. And then there would not be federal
prosecution at all. In effect, that would give states the ability
. to veto a federal prosecution.
And that would partially nullify federal criminal law. (Y'all
know about "nullification," right?) In short, a state government
could pardon someone, but without the dual sovereignty
doctrine, that pardon would not only absolutely bar state
prosecution but federal prosecutions as well. What seems really
odd, as evidenced in the Rodney King case, is the asserted
reason why the federal government could not prosecute state
officers for federal criminal civil rights violations-the Four-
teenth Amendment and reconstruction. Think about the
picture. White state officers, acting under state law, beat up a
black citizen. The federal government tries to come in and
prosecute these officers on the grounds that such actions were
an abuse of the black citizen's federal civil rights. But the
claim is that the federal government cannot do this because of
the Fourteenth Amendment! Yet, on one level the Fourteenth
Amendment was precisely about giving the federal government
power to engage in just these kinds of federal criminal
prosecutions. .
Indeed the Fourteenth Amendment was largely about
providing a firm constitutional foundation for the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Section Two of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
explicitly states that it is a federal crime for state officials to
violate citizens' civil rights. Section Two of the Civil Rights Bill,
which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to constitu-
tionalize, is the very statute the Los Angeles Police Department
officers were charged with violating. And so it seems a little
strange that the reason the Feds cannot prosecute is because
of the Fourteenth Amendment itself-an amendment that was
about authorizing just those kinds of prosecutions. Conse-
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quently, there could be a fear that state governors might offer
quick pardons for abusive state officers or that state courts
might even acquit them in whitewashed or pattycake trials,
thereby thwarting federal criminal enforcement of the civil
rights laws.
In essence there are two basic ideas. On the one hand
there is the basic argument after the Fourteenth Amendment
that if one is privileged against the Feds and also privileged
against the states, one should be privileged against both
governments together. On the other hand, there is the
Fourteenth Amendment argument that asks why the federal
government should be prevented by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself from enforcing federal civil rights laws against state
officers.
Resolving this question is not entirely simple since there
exists no magical piece of historical evidence that solves that
puzzle or any word in the Constitution that definitively spells
out an answer. However, Jon Marcus and I have tried to
propose a sensible accommodation: Ordinary citizens should
generally not be subject to two prosecutions by different
governments. Let us say for example that someone is alleged
to have committed a murder or a bank robbery. Since that
person is privileged against one government and against the
other government, that individual should be privileged from
dual prosecution by the two of them together. However, there
should be different rules for state officials because here we may
be more suspicious of state prosecution; it might be a sham or
a fraud. Therefore, we may wish to allow the federal govern-
ment to prosecute afterwards, vindicating federal supremacy
and enforcing the civil rights laws.
Why, you might ask, should we have special rules for
government officials? Our answer is that they wield more
power than ordinary citizens. If they do not want to be
subjected to this dual prosecution regime, they should not
take office. No one has forced them to enter office and wield
this kind of power. With a special monopoly of power over
fellow citizens, they are capable of much greater abuses. And
we are also more suspicious that their state prosecution may
be collusive-a sham, a pattycake, whitewash trial.
Here is where impeachment comes into play. The separa-
tion of powers analogy suggests that because federal officials
wield tremendous power over fellow citizens, they, and only
they, are typically subject to two federal prosecutions. First
they may be tried in a quasi-criminal court of impeachment,
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that not only removes them from office, but dishonors them
and sometimes even disqualifies them from any future office.
Mter this penal, quasi-eriminal proceeding, they are also
subject to ordinary criminal prosecution in an ordinary
criminal trial. In essence, the impeachment clause actually says
that there should be some special rules for government
officials because they wield so much power over people. And
so we might need to modify double jeopardy principles slightly
because we are generally concerned about government power.
Maybe you do not buy that particular resolution, and
maybe you do. What I hope you see is the big point: In
thinking about this issue, we must not only think about the
founding but also about reconstruction. Furthermore, we
should think about how the reconstruction values play out on
both sides of this issue. In the Rodney King case, we saw how
the police officers made strong Fourteenth Amendment
arguments. But at the same time, we should see the Four-
teenth Amendment concern on the other side-the concern
that states not be able to nullify federal criminal enforcement
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which today is Section 242 of
the Criminal Code.
II. WHAT IS THE SAME OFFENSE?
Moving on to the second topic, let us suppose that these
individuals were not government officials, but rather ordinary
citizens. How should we decide whether two different prosecu-
tions are really for the same offense or for different offenses?
We have two statutes. They are prosecuted in the first trial
under statute A, and then they are prosecuted in the second
trial under statute B. For now, let us say that both prosecu-
tions are by the same government; let us, in other words,
assume away the dual sovereignty problem.
The question then revolves around the criminal laws
themselves. Is this the same law or are they different laws? The
.courts have gone around and around on this issue. Sometimes
. they use a test called "Blockburger," which, in effect, states
that if one offense is a lesser-included one within the other,
then they count as the same offense. In other cases, courts
review the transaction to see whether the two crimes came out
of the same crime spree or episode, and involved the same
factual set of events. Under this transaction test, if they do
involve the same set of events, they should be considered the
, same offense, even if one is murder and one is kidnapping.
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But I suggest that there is an even cleaner and simpler
understanding of sameness. And it is a literI one. Same really
means same. Murder is the same as murder; it is not the same
as attempted murder, even though attempted murder is a
lesser-included offense. Robbery is the same as robbery, but is
not the same as armed robbery, even though armed robbery
is a greater offense and robbery is a lesser-included offense.
Murder and kidnapping are different, even if they came out
of the same transaction.
At first, this might not seem to be at all protective of
defendants, because the government can prosecute you once,
say, for armed robbery; and then if they do not get you for
that, then they can turn around and prosecute you for
robbery; then if they do not get you for that, they can try bank
robbery. And each one is technically different from every
other. So we need to supplement the "same means same"
approach with additional principles.
First, if you, the defendant, have won an acquittal or if you
prevail on any issue, you should be able to prevent the
government from relitigating that issue. This is the principle
of collateral estoppel. However, collateral estoppel here is
asymmetric in two ways. First, it protects those who are
innocent more than those who are guilty, because it works
only if the defendant was acquitted of something in the first
proceeding. On the other hand, double jeopardy is symmetri-
cal-autrefois convict, autrefois acquit. Let us reconsider the
Heath case. Some of you probably had different responses to
that case, depending on whether Heath got acquitted or
convicted in the first trial. Most of us are probably more
concerned about the person who was acquitted in the first
trial. In this way, our intuition is asymmetric, and so is the
collateral estoppel principle.
But it is asymmetric in one other way. The government
can never use collateral estoppel against you if you lose. If they
reprosecute after you have lost the first trial, they have to
prove your guilt all over again. But if you win the first trial,
you have won forever-no questions asked. They can never try
to relitigate that issue against you. It is asymmetric just like
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is asymmetric. That, in
essence, is the collateral estoppel issue. Under this principle,
once you have beaten the government on an issue, you have
beaten them forever. You do not ever have to relitigate. So, for
example, once you have been acquitted of robbery you cannot
be charged with bank robbery because you have already been
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acquitted of one element of that offense. They can never
prove that robbery against you. And if they cannot prove the
robbery, they cannot prove armed robbery either.
In addition to this due process idea, there is another due
process idea that applies in cases where the government
prosecutes someone twice. If the offenses grow out of the
same transaction, even for different offenses like robbery and
kidnapping, the government must explain why it did not
prosecute you in a single proceeding. In short, government
officials must justify why they are choosing to prosecute you in
a piecemeal fashion. Sometimes there are good reasons for
prosecution in such a disjointed fashion-even in greater and
lesser-included offenses. For example, let us say that a defen-
dant stabs the victim. The victim is mortally wounded, but has
survived thus far. The defendant is charged with attempted
murder and convicted. Immediately after that conviction, the
victim dies from injuries proximately caused by the stabbing.
The prosecutor then tries to charge the defendant with
murder. The prosecutor then says, "Look, the reason I did not
bring the murder charge to begin with is because the death
had not yet occurred." This is an acceptable, non-vexatious
reason for having prosecuted in two bites, rather than one. So
in order to prosecute twice, the prosecutor must explain why
she chose to go after someone in two bites rather than one.
I propose that in deciding what constitutes a "same
offense," we employ thr~e simple principles. First, same
offense means same offense-same in fact and in law. Murder
is murder, which is not the same as attempted murder.
Second, collateral estoppel means that once you have beaten
the government once on an issue, you have won forever. And
third, if government is going to prosecute you for different
offenses the government must provide good reason. This
overall three-pronged approach satisfies plain meaning; it
basically includes most cases and better explains our moral
intuitions.
III. THEJURY
Finally, we tum to a topic that is even more controversial:
. taintedjuries. Suppose an individual is on trial for murder. Let
us say that the defendant bribes the jury, and is, unsurpris-
ingly, acquitted. Clearly the defendant can be charged with
bribery, but can this person ever be charged with murder,
.under the theory that the first acquittal did not count? Several
. states, using this very theory, would charge this defendant with
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murder. A sham acquittal-a collusive or fraudulent acquit-
tal-does not count. So if someone bribed the jury, or
intimidated the jury, the resulting acquittal should not count.
Now consider a much trickier question: What if the jury is
racially rigged? If the jury is racially stacked in an unconstitu-
tional way, because of a defendant's peremptory challenges,
should that taint the jury verdict? Perhaps so on the theory
that this jury is not a real jury. This acquittal is not a real
acquittal; it does not speak for the people. And therefore,
perhaps we should allow reprosecution. Indeed, there are
some similarities to the bribery example. However, there are
some differences. Bribery is a crime,· but a peremptory
challenge, even if in violation of Batson8 and McCollum,9 is not
exactly a crime. It might be unconstitutional, but it is not a
crime. One occurs secretly, and the other in open court.
Double jeopardy law is fundamentally linked to jury trial.
But double jeopardy law generally says that once acquitted,
someone has been acquitted forever. This is partly because our
system gives that first jury the power even to nullify a law. The
real question is then: Do we really believe in this theory-even
when we do not truly trust the first jury or when we think the
first jury is somehow skewed so that does not represent the
people?
There is yet another linkage. Jury trial must be thought of
in connection with other political rights-voting and represen-
tation. The Fifteenth Amendment, for example, bans race
discrimination in voting, and, I suggest, applies not just to
voting for legislatures, but voting in juries as well. And if you
have race discrimination in who gets to vote on a jury, then
maybe that body is no longer representative. If that body is
not representative- if it is a sort of mal-constituted body--do
we really want to give finality to a judgment of acquittal? This
question is clearly provocative and difficult. And we must not
limit our thought to the founding vision and our love for
j~~ies, but we must also think in terms of a reconstruction
VISIon.
Who should be on our juries? Should our juries be
composed of blacks as well as whites? These questions arose
after the Fifteenth Amendment. And after the Nineteenth
Amendment, we should include women as wen as men. If they
8 Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
9 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
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have a right to vote for legislatures, don't they also have the
right to be voted for and to vote in a legislature? Doesn't a
similar reasoning apply tojuries-to the right to vote in ajury?
And if blacks, as political equals, have a right to political
equality, how should we think about skewed juries that result
from racial manipulation? Once again, we must think not only
about the founding, but also about reconstruction.
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